

国際コンフリクト管理に関する 統合的記述モデルを用いた研究 ～コソヴォ紛争を事例として～

A STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT MANAGEMENT WITH AN INTEGRATIVE EXPLANATORY MODEL: THE CASE STUDY OF THE KOSOVO CONFLICT

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This paper explores the Kosovo Conflict through the use of the Cognitive Conflict Evolution Model and the Integrative Explanatory Model. The paper discusses the perceptions of two conflicting sides, the Kosovo Serbs and the “West” represented by the United Nations Missions in Kosovo (UNMIK), investigating how from a perspective different from the common branding of the Serbs as the perpetrators and the Albanians as the victims, the West can be perceived as contributing to an exacerbation of the situation by the “rational loop” which leads to an aggravation of the human rights situation and the “cognitive loop” which leads to a support of independence under unsatisfactory human rights situations. The Integrative Explanatory Model provides a holistic representation of the main factors of the conflict, supplementing the mechanism unraveled by the Cognitive Conflict Evolution Model.

キーワード : *Kosovo, Cognitive Conflict Evolution Model, Integrative Explanatory Model, Geopolitics, Conflict Resolution, United Nations Mission in Kosovo*

1. Introduction

1.1. Background and Objective

Since the breakup of Yugoslavia and the subsequent bloody civil wars, extensive research has been conducted in the area of ethnic conflicts, humanitarian intervention (e.g. Moral Hazard Theory) or the legality, morality and consequences of the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia. Yet, these researches have failed to address the seemingly essential question with regard to the Kosovo Conflict: *What are the factors that hinder the realization of a democratic, multiethnic and tolerant society in Kosovo?*

Due to neglect of this central question, the following problems are still unresolved in Kosovo:

1. Problems of communication between UNMIK and Belgrade, the Kosovo Serbs, respectively.
2. Return of refugees.
3. Destruction of cultural property of minorities.

It is of interest to discuss why the Kosovo conflict remains unsolved and why UNMIK's objectives were not

achieved (as of 2007). Therefore, the main objective of this research is to build a model explaining the evolution and outcome of the Kosovo conflict and to provide a logical explanation in an integrative, holistic manner.

2. The Kosovo Conflict: A Historical Overview

2.1. Kosovo: Geography and History

Kosovo Province is situated in the heart of the Balkan Peninsula surrounded by the neighboring territories of Serbia, Montenegro, Albania and Macedonia. The earliest known inhabitants of Kosovo are believed to be the “Illyrians”, but by the end of the 8th century the Slavs had colonized most of the area of modern Yugoslavia, including Kosovo. In 1389, in the Battle of Kosovo Polje, Kosovo became a part of the Ottoman Empire and Albanians migrated into Kosovo. The Great Migration of Serbs out of Kosovo in the 17th century and the resettlement by Albanians tilted the demography towards Albanian majority. After the defeat of the Ottoman Turks in the

Russo-Ottoman War in 1878, the northern parts of Kosovo were controlled by Bulgaria, but the rest remained under Ottoman rule. In 1912, during the first Balkan War, Serbia, Montenegro, Greece and Bulgaria attacked Albania, which was in alliance with the Turks. The Serbian Army defeated the Albanians, the Serbian peasants reoccupied the land, and in 1912, Serbia was given sovereignty over Kosovo. Albania was recognized as a fully independent state in the Treaty of London in 1913, but there existed much anti-Serbian sentiment. In 1913, the second Balkan War broke out in which Bulgaria attacked the Serbian and Greek armies in Macedonia, but were quickly and decisively defeated. In 1914, after Austria-Hungary annexed Bosnia-Herzegovina, a Serbian student assassinated the Austrian Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo, triggering World War I which continued until November 11, 1918. Austria-Hungary supported by Germany, declared war on Serbia. Russia came into the war in support of Serbia, followed by France and Britain. The peace treaties of 1919-1920 established a Yugoslav state which included the Slovenes, Croats, Serbs, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro and Macedonia. In World War II, the Yugoslav government was coerced into joining the Tripartite Pact, but an anti-axis coup followed two days later and Germany began bombing Yugoslavia on April 6th. In 1945, the British Government withdrew support for Mihailovic and began supporting Marshall Tito and the Communists. After the end of the war, a new communist Yugoslavia composed of the republics of Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro and Macedonia was formed, but Kosovo was not recognized as a republic. It was defined as an “autonomous region” under Federal, not Serbian jurisdiction. The 1974 constitution made Kosovo an “Autonomous Province” of the Republic of Serbia and granted equal constitutional element of the Federation as one of the eight federal units. Albanians in Kosovo began to call for an “ethnically clean” Kosovo after Tito’s death in 1980, and an increasing amount of Serb migration occurred out of Kosovo due to widespread intimidation and violence as Kosovo Albanians called for status as a republic within Yugoslavia (Dempsey, 1998).

2.2. Outbreak of the Kosovo Conflict

In September 1991, the parliament of Kosovo overwhelmingly approved a resolution supporting the “Independence and Sovereignty of Kosovo” and by the summer of 1992, Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo essentially completely separated from each other. The Albanian leadership in Kosovo boycotted the 1992 Yugoslav elections, and violence broke out after the Dayton Accord which denied any additional

changes in the borders within Yugoslavia.

In March 1997 the civil government in Albania collapsed into anarchy. Following several years of conflict in Kosovo, the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) had become strong enough to challenge Yugoslav forces and a whole-scaled war for independence erupted in Kosovo during 1998. After several warnings by the West to use military force, a conference was held at Rambouillet to negotiate an end to the war. The participating parties were (1) the Western allies and Russia, (2) Yugoslavia and (3) representatives of the Kosovo Albanians. Two rounds of negotiations were held and at the end of the second round, the Kosovo Albanian delegation signed the proposed peace agreement but the talks broke up without a signature from the Serbian delegation, due mainly to a NATO-presented “ultimatum” that was unacceptable for Milosevic. On March 24th, 1999, NATO began an overall bombing campaign with an expectation that Yugoslavia would capitulate to the West and sign the Rambouillet agreement. Yugoslavia instead stepped up its war with the KLA, and the bombing continued for 78 days. On June 3rd, 1999, Yugoslavia and NATO signed the Kumanovo Agreement which called for “substantial” autonomy for Kosovo and “substantial” NATO presence in Kosovo, but that the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia would be respected (i.e. Kosovo remains a part of Yugoslavia).

The agreement was reached after NATO compromised on three major issues as listed below:

- (1) NATO – not the UN – would lead the foreign occupation of Yugoslavia
- (2) An annex to the Rambouillet agreement which would have given NATO troops free reign to occupy all of Yugoslavia without accountability
- (3) Requirement for a referendum on Kosovo’s independence, slated to occur in three years’ time under the Rambouillet ultimatum .

The central tasks of the UNMIK, installed subsequent to the Kumanovo agreement, were (1) to ensure the rights of refugees to return home, (2) to ensure commitment of all member states to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Yugoslavia, (3) to establish a functioning interim civil administration, (4) to promote the establishment of substantial autonomy and self-government, and (5) to facilitate a political process to determine Kosovo’s future status (Yannis, 2004). A functioning civil administration was established, the KLA was transformed into the Kosovo Protection Corps and the 10 seats were reserved for the Serbs in the Assembly of Kosovo, but the security situation for Serbs did not improve significantly.

Facing unbroken and continuous discrimination against

minorities, UNMIK chief Michal Steiner initiated in 2002 the so-called “Standards before Status” policy, a series of standards of international expectations for Kosovo’s institutions and society, giving priority to realization of these standards before discussions of Kosovo’s future status. In March 2007, although the situation in Kosovo has not improved significantly, UN Special Envoy Martti Ahtisaari proposed conditional independence as the final status for Kosovo Province with US support and Russian and Serbian opposition (Todorovic, 2006).

This paper is based on the research activities conducted up until September 2007, and therefore, the events described hereon after in this section are not included in the analysis. Yet, because the objective of the paper is to analyze the events during and immediately after the Kosovo Conflict, the exclusion of the below events does not undermine the legitimacy of the paper’s claims.

2.3. Declaration of Independence

On February 17, 2008, the Assembly of Kosovo approved a declaration of independence and in the following days, countries such as the United States, Turkey, Albania, Austria, Germany, Taiwan, and others announced their recognition of the Republic of Kosovo while countries such as Russia and Serbia have opposed. In the UN Security Council, the United States, UK and France have recognized the declaration while the People’s Republic of China has expressed concern and Russia considers the declaration as illegal. The neighboring states of Montenegro, Macedonia, Albania, Croatia, Bulgaria and Hungary have also recognized the declaration.

3. Research Methodology

The methodology employed in this research is designed in a three-phase process. In the first phase, empirical data was obtained from field surveys, official policy documents and secondary literature. The official documents include the Serbian documents including the Declaration on Kosovo and Metohija of the National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia, the United Nations documents include the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1160, the Secretary Statement to the General Assembly, and so forth. Secondary literature, video material and internet data sources were also explored.

The conclusion of the first phase of the research was that there existed no model or theory that can sufficiently explain the current situation in Kosovo. Therefore, an attempt was made in this research to construct an integrative model, which

represents the whole conflict situation. Due to the significance of the Balkan Peninsula in the context of the Eurasian Power contest, it was speculated that the theoretical assumptions of realism should be overriding in the Kosovo Conflict. Further, the research employed a new approach of data collection and analysis known as Multilingual Comparative Data Analysis which analyzes and compares different multilingual data in order to assess possibly existing biases in the reporting of the same event by different international media in different languages.

In the second phase of the research, as abovementioned, a field study was performed in Serbia proper and Kosovo Province as a part of the case study. From May 20, 2006 to May 30, 2006, one of the authors (“the interviewer” hereonafter), together with two other Japanese citizens, conducted a series of qualitative interviews using open-ended questions. Interviewees were selected from different parties, and classified into three groups: the first group was composed of people actively involved in the conflict and have executive power, the second group of people who are involved in the conflict with indirect influence but no executive power, and the third group which was composed of those individuals who were affected by the conflict but had no means to influence its outcome.

The authors also attempted to maintain a balance in selecting the interviewees (e.g. in interviewing high-ranking officials, Dr. Todorovic, the second highest ranking Serbian politicians for Kosovo and Mr. Berisha, the highest ranking K-Albanian politician, were selected).

The exact number of key interviewees is 10, but not all of the profiles of interviewees could be presented in the paper because of specific requests by interviewees not to disclose information that may lead to their identification. The number of interviewees (including group interviews) was relatively small due to the extreme sensitivity of the case. However, because the objective of these interview exist not in their statistical legitimacy but in their potential to excavate the wide array of perceptions that exist without a priori categorization, the authors have deemed the data obtained from field surveys to be sufficient for the purpose of this research.

There is a methodological issue that information derived from the interviews should be given different interpretive consideration from that of the literature and other secondary sources. In reflection of this point each piece of evidence has been cross-examined to verify the internal consistency among different data categories.

In the third and final phase of the research, the Integrative Explanatory Model was applied. Integrative models

are models that integrate different theories and concepts. The first step in this model-building process was to illustrate the results of the previous phases and establishing a causal relationship between them. For this, an influence diagram was designed for the Kosovo Conflict in which the factors leading to the outcome “West ‘supports’ Kosovo Albanians”, found from evidence in existing research and inconsistencies in the representation of the current situation in Kosovo and past events, are categorized into the following: geopolitical factors, personal factors, UNMIK mission-related factors and cognitive and perceptual factors. Having constructed an integrative explanatory model to illustrate the entirety of the conflict, each of the factors was explored in detail, and a Cognitive Conflict Evolution Model was constructed. This model is related to Cognitive Dissonance Theory, which is one of the most classic theories in the field of social psychology. Most of a person’s cognitions are in a cognitive irrelevant relationship, but if two cognitions are relevant to each other, they are either consonant or dissonant (Festinger 1957, Festinger and Carlsmith 1959, Zanna and Copper 1974). According to the theory of cognitive dissonance, people are usually motivated to reduce or avoid psychological inconsistencies (Plous 1993). Therefore, people are inclined to reduce dissonance in the following ways: (1) removing dissonant cognitions, (2) adding new consonant cognitions, (3) reducing the importance of dissonant cognitions, or (4) increasing the importance of consonant cognitions.

In section 5 of this paper, it is argued that perceptions by the West may at times be synthesized and fortified by such attempt to reduce dissonance or increase consonance in their policies in reacting to the situation in Kosovo, therefore creating a cognitive loop in which a perception shapes reality (i.e. policies), and reality in turn shapes the perception.

4. Integrative Explanatory Model – Construction Process and Analysis of Facts

As abovementioned, the Integrative Explanatory Model employed in this research categorized the factors for the outcome “West ‘supports’ K-Albanians” into four main categories: (1) Cognitive and perceptual factors, (2) Geopolitical factors, (3) Personal Factors and (4) Mission-related factors.

Firstly, regarding cognitive and perceptual factors, this paper argues that there are two important observations regarding Western perception of the Kosovo conflict. First, during the Kosovo conflict, the Kosovo Albanians have generally been portrayed by Western media as victims of

Serbian oppression and terror, serving as the main moral ground for the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia and still used as the main premise in the argumentation employed by proponents of independence as the final status of Kosovo. This perception created an atmosphere that allowed for reverse discrimination against the Kosovo Serbs, which had actually begun under the reign of Tito when a “strong Yugoslavia” was sought. This was considered as equivalent to a “weak Serbia” because Tito dispersed Serbs into other republics of Yugoslavia, a policy which decreased the power of Serbs in the Republic of Serbia. Any opposition against these policies was met with terror. In the years following the 1974 revision of the Yugoslav constitution in which Kosovo was granted separate federal representation, cases of discrimination and abuse against Serbs have been reported. In 1989, Belgrade downgraded Kosovo’s autonomy to its pre-1974 level, Milosevic was elected president of Serbia, and oppression of Kosovo Albanians began under his regime.

As illustrated here, the entire picture of the Kosovo conflict can be completed only if both of the two phases of the conflict are thoroughly considered: the pre-1989 years in which Kosovo Serbs were oppressed and assaulted, and the post-1989 years in which the Kosovo Albanians were oppressed under the Milosevic regime. Yet, the Western media almost univocally agrees on the premise that the Kosovo Albanians fight for human rights and oppression in Kosovo, led by the political leader of the Albanians, Rugova, in regard to the oppressive policies imposed by the Serbian government under Milosevic. This perception does not take into account the whole background which led to an imposing of Milosevic’s draconic measures towards Kosovo after his notorious words “nobody shall dare beat you (Kosovo Serbs) again”. This event is generally characterized in Western media as the beginning of an uprising of Serbian nationalism and the outbreak of hostilities of the Kosovo Albanian plight in Kosovo, both personified by Milosevic.

The mass media, such as public relations companies and news agencies, played an integral role in formulating Western perception of the Kosovo conflict. Takagi (2005) reports, that Jim Harff – the main character responsible at Ruder Finn for the Bosnian Muslims’ propaganda, himself admitted that the main purpose of feeding the mass media with biased anti-Serbian information was to get them on fact-finding missions on the ground for their cause (i.e. finding and backing information which is advantageous to Ruder Finn’s clients, the Bosnian Muslims and Croats). From the viewpoint of characterization, the wars in the former Yugoslavia evolved in a generally unfavorable way for the Serbs, under President Milosevic, who were branded as the aggressors. This branding of Serbs is said to have been initiated by

a PR Company, who coined the term *ethnic cleansing*, closest in meaning to the word “holocaust” but used for the Serbs’ actions.

This branding of the Serbs as aggressors during the wars in Croatia and Bosnia had allowed for a good/bad dualistic simplification of the conflict. Herman (2003) lists four “wrong characterizations” promulgated by the Western media: branding Milosevic as the source of the Balkan conflict, concluding that Milosevic’s 1989 nationalist speech as the beginning of Serbian nationalism and the cause of the following wars, NATO reasonableness and Serb intransigence at Rambouillet, and the classification of Serb actions during the NATO bombing as “Serb genocide”. The characterization of the events during the NATO bombardment shows three perceptions: (1) the Serbs were killing vast numbers; (2) this was a part of the process of “ethnic cleansing” and genocide, and (3) the expulsion of K-Albanians had been planned and was not due to NATO bombing.

Secondly, geopolitical and geoeconomic factors also played an integral role in the development and the outcome of the Kosovo conflict. The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union made the United States the sole superpower with unrestrained power to dictate the new world order. This fact is related to the Kosovo conflict in that the dissolution of Yugoslavia must be understood not only as a civil war, but as a part of a bigger geopolitical game.

Against the general perception of the majority of scholars, some recent analyses suggest that the beginning of the Yugoslav tragedy was initiated by the U.S. out of geostrategic moves. The Balkans were still of vital interest to the U.S. for two important reasons: first, the Balkan Peninsula under U.S. control would push the Russian influence sphere back and provide an enlargement area of NATO because it connects U.S. ally Turkey with former Warsaw Pact Eastern European states. Second, the Balkan Peninsula was considered an important gateway for future oil transports coming from the Caspian Region to Western Europe.

Thirdly, personal factors refer mainly to external factors that may have existed before the events that led directly to the conflict, such as past relations between the United States and Serbs. Since Milosevic’s rise to power in 1989, some authorities in the United States began to view his regime as xenophobic and characterized by Serbian nationalism. For example, United States governmental organizations such as the CIA have expressed Milosevic’s leadership as “leading various military campaigns to unite ethnic Serbs in neighboring republics into a ‘Greater Serbia’”. These perceptions regarding the Serbs may have developed into the United States waiting to remove Milosevic from power and a consequent alliance with the KLA.

UNMIK mission-related factors were extracted from the interviews, in which some of the officials have stated that the

mission itself may have been too costly to sustain for a longer period of time, and that there was never a clear definition for victory in the mission, which led to a lack of incentive for the West to solve the fundamental social issues that remained in Kosovo as well as their eagerness to bring about a concise, dualistic conclusion to the conflict rather than to investigate deeply into both sides of the conflict.

5. Model Formulation: Cognitive Conflict Evolution Model and Integrative Explanatory Model

5.1. Field Study – Cognitive Conflict Evolution Model

From May 20, 2006 to May 30, 2006, the interviewer – together with two Japanese citizens – performed a field study in Belgrade, Pristina, Kosovo Polje, Lipljan and Caglavica. Interviews were conducted and important observations were stored by video and photographic devices. Special attention was given to the different perceptions of the involved parties and an investigation of their argumentation because it reveals causal relationship which cannot be derived otherwise.

In the interview with the Vice President of the Coordination Centre for Kosovo, Dr. Milorad Todorovic, one important discovery was that the communication between the Serbian Government and UNMIK has deteriorated especially since the March 2004 rioting. This event can therefore be considered to be a key event in the conflict evolution. Dr. Todorovic pointed out that Serbs in Kosovo, including himself, have lost faith in the UNMIK after the March riots. He himself retreated from his post a Minister of Return in the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government in 2004.

In an interview with Mr. Berisha, the President of the Assembly of Kosovo and President of Kosovo’s largest political party, LDK, information was obtained regarding the argumentation and perceptions of the Kosovo Albanian leadership. First, the President of the Assembly of Kosovo stated that “Kosovo was already multiethnic” and that Kosovo had already taken, or was taking all measures to protect human rights and minorities. He further pointed out that “in all documents that we have developed up to now, and we sent to negotiation team for the negotiation process that is taking place in Vienna. In all these documents, the Albanian side has guaranteed in that we will protect the human rights of all minorities in Kosovo. And the international community received these documents.” Second, when asked about what concrete measures his government was planning to take to improve the human rights situation of the minorities in Kosovo, given the fact that the Serb lived in fear; Mr. Berisha answered

“I don’t think that they are afraid, this is not true. They are not afraid to use Serbian language.” The expulsion of 200,000 Serbs and other non-Albanians out of Kosovo was also denied.

In an interview with a UNMIK official and Political Affairs Office in the Immediate Office of the SRSG, it was found that he had not yet visited conglomerations of Kosovo Serbian villages near Kosovo Polje, a village in vicinity to Pristina which was targeted during the March 2004 riots. During the same interview the interviewee stated that the main reason why Kosovo Serbs were fleeing Kosovo was economical, and that the situation in the province in terms of the conflict is actually improving.

After evaluation of all obtained data, one crucial relationship was revealed, that a cognitive vicious circle into which the three involved parties – UNMIK, K-Serbs and K-Albanians – have fallen and which inadvertently exacerbates the conflict. The existence of this cognitive loop was rediscovered during interviews, where great commonality of the positions of UNMIK and K-Albanians on the one hand. The negation of the problematic security situation of K-Serbs by UNMIK officials and K-Albanians was found, on the other hand.

The Cognitive Conflict Evolution Model shows how the

West’s position at the beginning of the UNMIK mission from June 10, 1999 may be the cause of actions by the Kosovo Albanians and Kosovo Serbs, which led to the aggravation of the conflict situation. This aggravation is then further enhanced by the reaction of the West, which does not perceive that its own actions are in fact the cause of the outcome on which it now reacts. In other words, the West had created a self-reinforcing cognitive loop, where cognitive consonance occurs in which “the West supports K-Albanians” because the “West criticizes the Serbs”, and in this case, such a loop can only be avoided if it is perceived and causes of its increase are eliminated. This, however, requires a strong commitment to the resolution of the conflict. The detailed explanation of the Cognitive Conflict Evolution Model is as follows:

In Figure 1 below, the simplified process of interaction among the three players in Kosovo since the installation of UNMIK in Jun 1999 is illustrated. In this Cognitive Conflict Evolution Model, the actions of the three players are dependent on the actions of the other players, but the whole process is kicked-off by the West’s position from the beginning of the mission. The model shows that there are two loops, which influence the events in Kosovo.




Figure 1 Cognitive Conflict Evolution Model under UNMIK

In order to be considered a valid causal relationship, the different variables must be related. We can define a dependent variable “perception” and independent variable “behavior” in the model. The perception of a player is always dependent on the behavior of another player. This relationship is necessary causation, *i.e.* the variable “behavior” must be followed by the variable “perception”, for there is no perception about anything if there is any behavior of somebody that creates this perception. Conversely, independent variables may or may not be influenced by external factors. The behavior of K-Albanians can be influenced by perceptions, but the driving force behind the resulting behavior is stronger than the influence of perceptions. This can be summed as the manifestation of a self-image that the individual holds in his subconscious mind as opposed to the conscious nature of perceptions. This image depends on deeper-rooted cognitive factors, such as history, education, tradition and other inner values *i.e.* root causes for human behavior which have to be planted in the subconscious mind, and this can only be done by choosing thoughts.

In addition, the West’s explicit criticism of the Serbs as oppressors may emit a message that K-Albanians rightfully perceive this as the West’s “green light” for suppression of K-Serbs, creating a rational causal loop that allows for the suppression of the criticized.

5.2. Analysis of the Causality in Cognitive Conflict Evolution Model

The analysis of the causal loop in the Cognitive Conflict Evolution Model starts with the first event “West ‘supports’ K-Albanians”. This leads to a perception of the K-Albanians that they can continue with the suppression of K-Serbs. This is a very strong assumption that requires discussion. First, supportive evidence for “West ‘supports’ K-Albanians” must be shown, or in other words it must be proven that the perception of the K-Albanians is caused by the West’s action, and not by other possible factors.

An analysis of the factors leading to “West ‘supports’ K-Albanians” has revealed that two fundamental causing factors for the perception in the West about the Kosovo was the premise based on historical understanding of the conflict. While most existing theories are based on the premise that K-Albanians have the moral and ethical right to independence and self-government because of the crimes and suppression they had experienced under Serb President Milosevic in the 1990s, such theories overlook possible K-Albanian aspirations for an ethnically clean Kosovo in the previous decades. Evidence has been found in interviews with the expelled or internally displaced Serbs in Kosovo during the field survey.

Interviewees in Groups 3 remarked that there was always oppression on the Serbs by Albanians.

The “reverse ethnic cleansing theory”, most often promulgated as the state that the Kosovo Albanians in returning back to Kosovo after the NATO bombardment and the retreat of Serb police and military forces from Kosovo, have taken revenge on the Kosovo Serbs by expelling them, also proves to be problematic on several points. First, while this theory can explain the first wave of ethnically motivated attacks against the K-Serbs shortly after their return to Kosovo, there is difficulty in explaining why it has not stopped after an emotional period of revenge-taking has passed. Second, it is difficult to argue why the systematic destruction of churches and monasteries, a planned attack, could have occurred out of an emotional motivation of revenge. Surprisingly, there is little media coverage or academic research regarding this theory. Although this paper does not go deep enough into this issue as to be able to provide a clear explanation as to why such perception is lacking, it is an area that requires much investigation.

The next chain in the causal relationship in the model is the Kosovo Serbs’ reaction on the violence performed on them and the non-action of UNMIK/KFOR. This is perceived by the K-Serbs as Anti-Serbian and leads to a mistrust towards UNMIK. Evidence for this relationship has been found in interviews with all three groups of Serbian interviewees (see Zivanovic, 2007 for a complete report).

During the field study a great correlation between the positions of the UN officials and K-Albanian representatives have been found. It was stated that K-Serbs perceive UNMIK as anti-Serbian but it can be inferred from the available information on the ground that UNMIK/KFOR has no “mandate” to protect the K-Serbs and their property in Kosovo, which is a stated mission objective in UNSC 1244.

In interviews with UN officials, it was also found out that the reasons why minorities flee Kosovo are portrayed as “out of economic reasons”, but these statements do not represent the living conditions of the K-Serbs correctly. This research has discovered that although most of the K-Serbs live in difficult economic conditions, they stressed their wish to stay in Kosovo. According to Todorovic, most of the K-Serbs have stopped cooperation with UNMIK after the March riots because they have lost hope and sense in cooperating with UNMIK, which is viewed as incapable for securing their safety.

The Cognitive Conflict Loop represents the natural behavior of the UN officials working in Kosovo: a means to reduce the cognitive dissonant rate, which arises from the UNMIK’s cognition and the reality on the ground.

The existence of cognitive consonant/dissonant behavior follows from the obtained information of the interviewees and the statements of Western official. The obtained data gathered during the field study suggests that all four cognitive mechanisms which reduce cognitive dissonance are at work under UNMIK, which can be considered as a proof for the existence of the above illustrated cognitive consonant loop, which inadvertently leads to an aggravation of the situation in Kosovo.

The first possibility to reduce dissonance is to (1) remove dissonant cognitions. Applied to the Kosovo case, this can be done in two ways; (a) improve the real situation, *i.e.* the security situation for minorities in Kosovo, or (b) change the cognition about the situation. The second possibility to reduce dissonance is to (2) add new positive cognitions. Applied to the above Cognitive Conflict Evolution Model, this pattern was found in the fact that Kosovo Albanians' rights were stressed and it was pointed out that K-Albanians would not live any more under Belgrade rule now that they have their own rule. By emphasizing the positive sides of a situation, new positive cognitions are added and the negatives reduced. The third possibility to reduce dissonance is by (3) reducing the importance of dissonant cognitions. This can be done through stressing the positive outcomes and effects of the current situation and believing that they are more important than the negative sides. The fourth possibility is (4) to increase the importance of consonant cognitions. This can be done through stressing the positive outcomes and effects of the current situations. In the field study this mechanism has been found in the "praising of K-Albanians" improvements since the installation of the UNMIK.

5.3. Integrative Explanatory Model

The Integrative Explanatory Model, illustrated in Figure 2 on the previous page, integrates three different aspects; (1) time; (2) involved players and (3) their actions and perceptions. In this case, the Integrative Explanatory Model consists of three main time periods. The first time period covers the time before the installation of the UNMIK mission. The second time period covers actions and perceptions of the involved actors from the beginning of the UNMIK mission, namely June 10, 1999 to March 2004. The third time period covers the period after March 2004.

In the first time period two main groups of factors have been identified, which lead to three important actions by involved actors: perceptions of the Kosovo Conflict, importance of the Balkans and personal factors of importance. Originating from these three groups of factors, three main

actions are identified, which lead to a certain situation under which UNMIK was installed. In the group *Perceptions of the Kosovo Conflict*, seven important factors have been found. Those seven factors all lead to one important perception: *Perception of the Serbs as aggressors, perpetrators*. This perception leads to the actions *U.S. allies with KLA*. The group *Personal Factors of Importance* consists of two factors leading to the event *U.S. wants to get rid of Milosevic*. This factor also influences the decision of the U.S. to ally with the KLA, *i.e.* the event *U.S. allies with KLA*. The third group of factors is *Importance of Balkans*. This group consists of five factors which contribute to *Geostrategic Importance of the Balkan Region*. This importance has been identified to have favored the NATO bombing. The logical chain is as follows: *U.S. allies with KLA* leads to the failure of the peace talks at Rambouillet and *NATO bombing* is the result. As a result of the NATO bombing, the *Serbs expel K-Albanians* as an asymmetric means of warfare. The result of this Serb action is that the *U.S. favors an Albanian Kosovo* and this becomes an important influential factor for the evolution of the UNMIK mission.

In the second time period there are five groups of factors: *Mission related factors*, *factors about democratic standards*, *UNMIK's perception of the situation in Kosovo*, *Serb's perception of UNMIK* and *K-Albanians perception of UNMIK*. The *Mission-related factors* consist of 4 factors, which lead to the outcome *democratization efforts failed*. This outcome leads to the outcome *UNMIK seeks Exit Strategy*. The group of factors about democratic standards consists of three factors, which all influence the third group of factors, *UNMIK's perception* that the Albanians are also aggressors and perpetrators. The fourth group of factors is about Serb's perception of UNMIK. It consists of two factors: *UNMIK/KFOR does not protect Serbs*, and *UNMIK indirectly responsible for the expulsion of Serbs*, which both lead to the Serbs' action *Serbs create parallel institutions*. The fifth group of factors is *K-Albanians' Perception of UNMIK*. It consists of 4 factors: *UNMIK slows down way to independence*, *K-Albanians frustrated with UNMIK*, *UNMIK/KFOR does not protect Serbs*, and *K-Albanians perceive possibility for oppression of K-Serbs* which all lead to the *March 2004 riots*. Besides these five factor groups, there are also 5 identified actions: *K-Albanians attack Serbs*, *UNMIK transforms KLA into KPC*, *UNMIK –FRY document*, *Serbs create parallel institutions*, and the *March 2004 riots*.

The main causal chain in this time period is twofold. First, the outcome *U.S. favors Kosovo Albanians* is a direct and factor for the currently observed outcome *West "supports" Kosovo Albanians*. Parallel to this direct influence of the *U.S.*




Figure 2: Integrative Explanatory

favors Kosovo Albanians there is another causal chain: *U.S. favors Kosovo Albanians* leads to *KFOR has no order to protect Serbs*, and this fact influences the outcome *Democratization efforts failed*. At that same time *K-Albanians attack Serbs* has the effect that the *Democratization Standards are not fulfilled* by the K-Albanians, which leads to UNMIK's perception that the *K-Albanians are aggressors and perpetrators*. As a result of this perception, UNMIK tried to improve the situation by the action *UNMIK-FRY document*. This was a common document between UNMIK and Serbia, which led to an improvement of communication between Serbia and UNMIK for a short period of time. At the same time this action *UNMIK-FRY document* was perceived by K-Albanians in such a way that it led to the *March 2004 riots*. Finally, the action *UNMIK transforms KLA into KPC* directly led to the *March 2004 riots*, which again led to the action *Serbs stop cooperating with the UNMIK*. The riots also led to *UNMIK fears K-Albanian attacks*. Summarizing, four events directly point to the outcome *West 'supports' Kosovo Albanians: UNMIK seeks exit strategy, US favors Albanian Kosovo, UNMIK fears K-Albanian attack, and March 2004 riots*. This strong general support by the West for the Kosovo Albanians leads to the West's support for the independence of Kosovo.

Finally, as a main finding of the Integrative Explanatory Model, a new theoretical framework is derived which can be summarized by the following two main propositions:

Proposition 1: If the intervener in "humanitarian intervention" has different motivations than those presented to the public, the actions taken by the intervener are likely to lead to an exacerbation of the conflict.

Proposition 2: The circumstances on the ground in Kosovo create a cognitive loop, which inadvertently led to an exacerbation of the conflict.

6. Conclusion

This paper has explored the possibility of a holistic explanation of the Kosovo conflict by the use of an Integrative Explanatory Model. By embracing human cognitive theories, such as Cognitive Dissonance Theories, the paper introduced a new understanding of the events and circumstances which eventually led to the current situation in Kosovo. The main conclusions of this research are as follows:

- (1) Effective conflict management by the international community is one of the most crucial issues in dealing with inter-ethnic armed conflicts such as the Kosovo

conflict.

- (2) Several unperceived factors which had an impact on the outbreak of the conflict have not sufficiently been perceived by the international community, but were of crucial importance for all following decisions in relation to the conflict.
- (3) The Cognitive Conflict Evolution model has led to the conclusion that the cognitive state of UNMIK, which favors Kosovo Albanians in Kosovo, led to problems of communication between UNMIK and Belgrade.
- (4) Existing correlation between the positions of the K-Albanians and UN officials in Kosovo has a negative effect on the evolution of the conflict in two ways: it does not represent the real situation on the ground, and it has been concluded that the position of the West is perceived by the Kosovo Albanians as a possibility to exert more pressure on the existing Serbs.
- (5) Return of K-Serbs and other non-Albanians to Kosovo is still not possible due to a catastrophic security situation.

Contrary to existing research about the Kosovo conflict, the results of this research have provided a logical explanation of the seemingly illogical situation that the international community represented by the UNMIK in Kosovo has supported an independence of Kosovo under the circumstances described in this paper. As of 2009, Kosovo has already declared independence, and states around the world, excluding states such as Serbia, Russia and China, are beginning to recognize Kosovo as an independent, sovereign state. This paper does not cover this recent event due to the timing at which the field study was performed, and that the time periods covered in this paper suffice in laying the foundation for discourse regarding any subsequent events that might follow in the future. It is not the objective of this paper to assess or provide an opinion about the declaration of independence, but rather to define the spectrum of opinions that have existed both on the side which supports the way the conflict has evolved and those who oppose it.

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A STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT MANAGEMENT WITH AN INTEGRATIVE EXPLANATORY MODEL: THE CASE STUDY OF THE KOSOVO CONFLICT

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This paper explores the Kosovo Conflict through the use of the Cognitive Conflict Evolution Model and the Integrative Explanatory Model. The paper discusses the perceptions of two conflicting sides, the Kosovo Serbs and the "West" represented by the United Nations Missions in Kosovo (UNMIK), investigating how from a perspective different from the common branding of the Serbs as the perpetrators and the Albanians as the victims, the West can be perceived as contributing to an exacerbation of the situation by the "rational loop" which leads to an aggravation of the human rights situation and the "cognitive loop" which leads to a support of independence under unsatisfactory human rights situations. The Integrative Explanatory Model provides a holistic representation of the main factors of the conflict, supplementing the mechanism unraveled by the Cognitive Conflict Evolution Model.

Key Words: *Kosovo, Cognitive Conflict Evolution Model, Integrative Explanatory Model, Geopolitics, Conflict Resolution, United Nations Mission in Kosovo*